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Businesses are increasingly valued according to their intellectual
property (IP) rights, particularly patents.' In a global market, these rights
can be exploited by various players in multiple jurisdictions. This can lead
to complicated problems, and the field of patent litigation is already one of
the most daunting. Patents and patent licenses have spawned some of the
longest 2-lasting ten years or more-and most expensive litigation,
particularly in America.3 The last decade witnessed about twenty or thirty
patent infringement cases a year, with calculated damages of about 1.5
billion dollars for this period. About sixty percent of these cases resulted in
awards in excess of a million dollars.4 Legal costs are very high. It has
been estimated that many cases cost between two and five million dollars to
. B.A. Near Eastern Archaeology, U.C. Berkely 1990; D.phil. Oriental Archaeology, Oxford
University 1995; M.S. Earth Sciences, U.C. Santa Cruz 2000; CPE Keele University 2004; BVC
City University 2005; LLM Munich Intellectual Property Law Center 2006; LLM International
Commercial Arbitration Law, Stockholm University 2008. This paper is an adaptation of a thesis
submitted to Stockholm University as part of the LLM course.
1. See Robert Pitkethly, The Valuation of Patents: A Review of Patent Valuation Methods
with Consideration of Option Based Methods and the Potential for Future Research (1997),
available at http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0599.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
2. One patent case even lasted for twenty-five years; the case was originally filed in 1973.
See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d. 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998), reh'g granted 148 F.3d
1384 (Fed. Cir. 1998), 525 U.S. 1177 (1998).
3. See Carl G. Love, The Risk/Reward Factors of U.S. Patents (Jan. 2006), available at
http://knowledgebase.pub.findlaw.con-i/scripts/getfile.pl?FILE=articles/pmsllp/pmslpOO0036&TITL
E=Subject&TOPIC=Science%20%2OTechnology%2OLawPatents&FILENAME=sciencetechnolog
ylaw.l_454 (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
4. See Love, supra note 3.
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litigate.' In one case, the parties spent almost 200 million dollars between
them. 6
In contrast to litigation, arbitration offers the hope of a patent dispute
being settled in less than a year, perhaps even six months.7 Most patent
arbitrations also cost less than eighty-five percent of the cost of litigating the
same case.8 The time taken to resolve the dispute can be made even more
predictable by the use of a clause in the arbitration agreement which
stipulates when the arbitrator is required to deliver a judgment. 9 Various
ways of limiting costs can also be agreed upon by the parties. However,
even with great savings in time and money, arbitration is not the preferred
method of resolving patent related disputes.'0 Current research suggests that
patent disputes of lesser value are more likely to be arbitrated." Where
large sums are involved, litigation is preferred.' 2 With the monetary value
of patents clearly in focus, in order for arbitration--or other forms of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 3-to be considered as an alternative to
litigation, the benefits must outweigh the drawbacks.14 Perceptions may be
as important as the reality. 5
At first sight, arbitration appears to be an excellent alternative. It is fast,
and can offer an award supported by enforcement in national courts, unlike
mediation.16 However, there are a number of important issues to consider.
5. See Gregg A. Paradise, Arbitration of Patent Infringement Disputes: Encouraging the Use
ofArbitration Through Evidence Rules Reform, 64 FORDHAM. L. REV. 247, 253 (1995).
6. See Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., Civ.A. No. 76-1634-MA, 19 WL 4087, at *1,
17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1711 (D.Mass 1991) (amending prior damage award and correcting clerical errors).
7. See Tom Arnold, Fundamentals of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Why Prefer ADR, 376
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 655, 670. Figures for an "average" time to resolution in patent
litigation are difficult to obtain. A mean of 1.12 years was found for patent suits in district court in
1995-1999. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect
Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REv. 889, 908 (2001).
8. See Paradise, supra note 5, at 261.
9. See id.
10. See Vivek Koppikar, Using ADR Effectively in Patent Infringement Disputes, 89 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 158, 164-65 (2007).
11. See Koppikar, supra note 10, at 164-65.
12. See id. at 166.
13. It is also possible for a purely technical issue to be considered by "expert determination"
where a panel of experts decide facts. These expert determinations are not arbitral awards and
cannot be enforced under the New York Convention. It must instead be enforced via contract. See
Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW 9-10 (1990).
14. See Koppikar, supra note 10, at 164-68.
15. See id. at 168.
16. Mediation is also an option, particularly if the parties are able to work together amicably.
See Willam F. Heinze, Patent Mediation: The Forgotten Alternative in Dispute Resolution, 18
AIPLA Q.J. 333, 342-43 (1990).
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This paper will address, in particular, the nature of an international patent
dispute and how the rules of the main arbitral institutions influence the
unfolding arbitration. The main issue considered here is if institutional rules
address the particular needs of patent disputes. Arbitral institutions are
prepared to resolve many kinds of disputes, but because they operate under
different rules, some may be more or less prepared for the special nature of
IP. Patent related disputes are even more specialized. Even small
differences in institutional rules can have a large impact upon the unfolding
arbitration. After a brief consideration of arbitrability, special attention is
paid to evidence, confidentiality, and interim relief in the various rules of
permanent arbitral institutions. These latter three elements are critical for
patent disputes. The primary sources are the rules themselves, supplemented
by relevant national laws and cases. Special attention is paid to online
sources, as the most up-to-date materials are in this medium.
Legal scholarship has not considered institutional rules in any detail, but
relevant secondary sources are considered. Because of the importance of the
United States in IP disputes, the majority of the discussion will focus on the
United States, although arbitral institutions based in a number of different
countries are examined. The base of an arbitral institution may not reflect
the geographical location of the parties. In order to be consistent, almost all
rules, laws, and cases are in English. In the discussion that follows it is
assumed that a dispute would involve a patent license. The assumption is
that the patent holder would be the claimant, and the licensee the
defendant. 17
II. PROBLEMS OF PATENT LITIGATION
Patents are territorial rights.' 8  They are registered in a particular
jurisdiction and protection is handled by the relevant authority. If a patent is
infringed, it would require litigation in every jurisdiction where the offense
took place to stop infringement.19 There are difficulties in preparing cases in
17. It is unlikely in a straightforward case that the patentee would be the defendant. In
complex license arrangements, where trade secrets, joint ventures, or other covenants beyond patent
licenses are involved, it is possible that the patent holder could be a defendant. See St. Regis Paper
Co. v. Royal Indus., 552 F.2d 309, 314-15 (9th Cir. 1977).
18. See PHILIP W. GRUBB, PATENTS FOR CHEMICALS, PHARMACEUTICALS AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY: FUNDAMENTALS OF GLOBAL LAW, PRACTICE AND STRATEGY 3 (1999).
19. See GRUBB, supra note 18, at 3.
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multiple countries.20 Different legal systems require varied procedural and
substantive treatment of the same issue.21 For example, in Germany issues
of infringement and invalidity cannot be considered in the same
proceeding.22 Infringement can be considered before a civil court with
specialized patent chambers.23 Invalidity must be considered by the Federal
Patent Court in Munich, in the first instance, and finally by the Federal
Supreme Court. 4
Parallel litigation also requires the retention of local counsel in every
jurisdiction where litigation is commenced. There is a real risk of
inconsistent judgments. This is even apparent in the nations that make up
the European Union, where legislation to harmonize patent policy is in
place.25 Perhaps the best known example is the Epilady case.26 The main
issue in this case was the doctrine of equivalents.27 Equivalent embodiments
are routinely accepted by German court, but remain a problem in English
courts. 28 German courts held that a "helical spring" should be considered
functionally equivalent to a slit rubber rod.29 In contrast, the English Court
of Appeal decided that the inventors of the Epilady did not consider a rubber
rod to be equivalent to their originally claimed helical spring. 30 These are
major differences of claim interpretation that would lead to uncertainty of
outcome when more than one jurisdiction is involved in a dispute.
Even without the problem of a multi-jurisdictional dispute, litigating
patents in the court system can be time consuming and expensive.3 Courts
are pressured to deliver timely judgments.32 At the same time masses of
evidence and rigid procedures mean that there is a limit as to how fast a case
20. See Jochen Pagenberg, The Arbitrability of Intellectual Property Disputes in Germany
(Mar. 3-4, 1994), available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/events/conferences/1994/pagenberg.html





25. It is worth noting that the European Court has held that, at present, IP is a matter for the
individual member states. See Case 35/87, Thetford Corp. v. Fiamma SpA, 1988 E.C.R. 3585.
26. See Oberladesgericht Diisseldorf [Dusseldorf Court of Appeals], GEWERBLICHER
RECHTSSCHULTZ UNDER URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONAL TEIL [GRUR INT.] 1993, at 242,
translated in 24 INT'L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. AND COPYRIGHT LAW 838 (1993) [hereinafter Epilady].
27. See Epilady, supra note 26.
28. See David Cohen, Article 69 and European Patent Integration, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1082,
1082-84 (1998).
29. See Epilady, supra note 26.
30. See Cohen, supra note 28, at 1083-1129.
31. See Paradise, supra note 5, at 253.
32. See Moore, supra note 7.
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can progress.33 This is further complicated by the fact that in America juries
are often used to consider issues of fact.34 Patent issues are often highly
technical and may be difficult for most jurors to comprehend. 5 As of 2000,
about fifty percent of all U.S. patent cases were tried before juries. Evidence
suggests that juries tend to favour patentees on validity issues more than
judges.36 This perceived bias in the system may influence some companies
to prefer litigation, but there are other important facts to consider as well.
Firms that are financially better off than their rivals may opt to litigate in
order to intimidate smaller firms that may not have the resources to engage
in a protracted legal struggle.37 Indeed, there may be no overt threat, but a
clear financial imbalance would likely cause the weaker party to question the
effectiveness of litigation.38  Evidence of this observation is difficult to
quantify, but some authors have suggested that patent arbitration usually
takes place between companies of similar financial standing.39 Cross-
licensing relationships may suggest a relative parity in economic terms.4°
As an example, the National Patent Board was founded by large U.S. firms
to replace litigation with ADR.41 With these considerations in mind, some
authors have called for compulsory arbitration of patent disputes.42 While
this may be an extreme contention, arbitration could be appreciated as-if
not leveling the field of play-at least putting the variables within the
control of the parties to the dispute. 3
33. See Marion M. Lim, ADR of Patent Disputes: A Customized Prescription: Not An Over-
The-Counter Remedy, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 155, 162 (2005).
34. See id. at 162.
35. See id. at 171-72.
36. James F. Davis, Judicial Management of Patent Litigation in the United States:
Observations from the Litigation Bar, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 549, 549 (2000).
37. William Kingston, The Case for Compulsory Arbitration: Empirical Evidence, E.I.P.R.
22(4) 154, 154-55 (2000).
38. Id. at 155.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 154.
42. Id.
43. Kingston, supra note 37, at 156.
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III. ARBITRATING PATENT DISPUTES
Arbitration is increasingly being appreciated as an alternative to
litigation.4 The year 2007 saw the first decline in U.S. patent litigation in
fifteen years.45  The reason for this may be multi-faceted, but one reason
could be that 375 IP cases were filed with the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) during that year.46 This trend is not limited to America.
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), based in Paris, estimates
that ten percent of their annual case load involves an IP element.47 In
contrast, the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
(SCC) had 170 cases in 2007, but only seven arbitrations involved licensing
agreements/IP. 48  The larger and more well-known arbitral institutions
appear to conduct the majority of IP arbitrations. This could be due to the
special nature of the rules of these institutions, some of which specifically
provide special rules for IP issues. However, it should be noted that many
general principles of arbitration are amenable to complicated international
disputes.
Arbitration can be conducted so that the forum can be chosen by the
parties in advance. While the seat of the arbitration may remain the same
throughout, not all parts of the arbitration must take place at the seat.
Depending upon the location of witnesses, documents, arbitrators, and
lawyers, it is possible for the arbitration to take place in several locations.
This is particularly important in multi-national disputes where it may not be
cost-effective to move a mass of evidence.49 In arbitrating a patent dispute,
parties can also resolve an issue in a single proceeding, in contrast to
litigation. In court, prior to a judge or jury deciding an issue of
infringement, it is the trial judge who decides how to interpret patent
claims. ° Interpretation is considered a question of law and not of fact, and
as a result it can be reviewed de novo before an appeals court.5 This can
add considerably to the time required to achieve a court decision.
44. Sophie Lamb & Aljandro Garcia, THE EUROPEAN & MIDDLE EASTERN ARBITRATION
REVIEW 2008, http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/handbooks/3/sections/5/chapters/66/ (last




48. SCC Institute Statistics 2007, http://www.sccinstitute.com/uk/About/Statistics/ (last visited
Mar. 10, 2009).
49. David W. Plant, Alternative Dispute Resolution, in PATENT LITIGATION 197, 255 (1988).
50. Kimberly M. Ruch-Alegant, Markman: In Light of De Novo Review, Parties to Patent
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Arbitration presents a contrast to litigation in procedure, as awards are
not so easily challenged.12 This means that costs for counsel and expert
witnesses are reduced if they only have to appear at one hearing.53 Unlike a
trial judge, arbitrators can also be selected for their particular skills.54
Experts in patent law as well as the relevant scientific field can be chosen by
the parties.55 Because of the relative difficulty in challenging arbitral
awards, a decision of a tribunal can be appreciated as more final and binding
than a court action.56 It has been estimated that over fifty percent of patent
damages awards are decided by juries in the United States, and the majority
of patent damages decisions are reversed on appeal or remanded.57 In
arbitration, however, there is a risk of an erroneous judgment which is very
difficult to set aside.58 But the increased control the parties have over the
arbitral process can offset potential problems.
Litigation normally can only offer damages and injunctions to a winning
party. From the perspective of a defendant, with the prospect of having to
pay punitive damages59 in a lost litigation, arbitration offers the hope of
having to pay less monetary damages. However, it is important at the outset
to consider the special characteristics of arbitration, as opposed to litigation,
as part of an overall strategy. Arbitration can settle differences in more
flexible ways. This can include licensing arrangements, agreements to share
technology or collaboration in a joint venture, and contracts that restrict
activities to certain areas. 60 However, before going further it is important to
consider the special nature of patents in various national laws.






58. Switzerland allows parties who are not domiciled there to opt out of the setting aside
procedure. Most nations do not allow this. See A.J. Van Den Berg, The Efficacy of Award in
International CommercialArbitration, 4 J.C. INST. ARB. 267, 268 (1992).
59. It is uncertain if an arbitral tribunal can order punitive damages even if the parties agree.
See M. Scott Donahey, Punitive Damages in International Commercial Arbitration, 10 J. INT'L ARB.
67, 71 (1993).
60. See Ruch-Alegant, supra note 50, at 323.
289
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IV. ARBITRABILITY
Public policy is often cited as a bar to arbitration of patent disputes. 6'
This does not suggest that it is impossible to find an arbitral tribunal to
consider the issue and render an award.62  Rather, it refers to the
enforceability of the award against the losing party. National courts would
also not refer an issue to arbitration if the subject matter cannot be legally
arbitrated.63 The reason for this is that the state is involved in the granting,
recognition, and enforcement of patent rights. This consideration may
therefore put a brake on the ability of an arbitrator appointed by the parties
to consider a dispute that may have an impact upon the general public. Yet
in practice this observation may be over stated. South Africa does not allow
arbitration of any kind of IP dispute. 64 Prior to 1993 Israel did not allow
arbitration of IP disputes. 65  Patent coverage and payments due to patent
holders from licensees are arbitrable in many countries, including Canada,66
France, 67 Germany, 68 Switzerland, 69 and the United Kingdom. 7° Only a few
countries allow issues of validity to be addressed, including Canada,
Switzerland, and the United States.7' Countries such as France and Italy
invoke public policy grounds and hold that validity must be considered in a
public tribunal. 7
2
The situation in the United States has undergone modification recently.
Interestingly, the first case where patent infringement was settled by
61. Lamb & Garcia, supra note 44.
62. Id.
63. See UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 8(1); New York Convention art 11 (3).
64. Article 18(1) of the Patents Act of 1978 states that: "Save as is otherwise provided in this
Act, no tribunal other than the commissioner shall have jurisdiction in the first instance to hear and
decide any proceedings, other than criminal proceedings, relating to any matter under this Act."
65. Golan Work of Art Ltd. v. Bercho Gold Jewellery Ltd., Tel Aviv District Court civil case
1524/93.
66. In Canada, any matter related to patents can apparently be arbitrated. See Jacques A.
Lger, et al. Possibility of Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes Between Private Parties,
available at http://www.robic.ca/publications/Pdf/0l 6-JAL.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
67. Robert Briner, The Arbitrability of Intellectual Property Disputes with Particular Emphasis
on the Situation in Switzerland, Worldwide Forum on the Arbitration of Intellectual Property
Disputes, March 3-4 1994, Geneva, Swizerland, available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/events/conferences/1994/briner.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
68. Jochen Pagenberg, The Arbitrability of Intellectual Property Disputes in Germany,
available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/events/conferences/1994/pagenberg.html (last visited Mar.
10, 2009).
69. See Briner, supra note 67.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Briner, supra note 67.
290
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arbitration was in 1939." 3 However, at this time issues of validity could not
be arbitrated.74 Despite a lengthy history, American courts had traditionally
been reluctant to enforce arbitrated settlements of patent disputes. In 1981, a
survey of fifty-one U.S. companies about their attitudes to arbitrating IP
disputes found that only ten percent would agree to arbitrate patent validity
in cases valued over a million dollars. For other IP disputes, sixty-eight
percent stated they would consider binding arbitration.75 In eschewing
patent arbitration, the main reasons these companies cited were "public
policy" and "antitrust., 76 In the U.S., legislation would soon address public
policy concerns.77
In 1982, Congress enacted Public Law 97-247, which allowed for
voluntary arbitration of patent infringement disputes. 78 Section 294(a) states
that:
A contract involving a patent or any right under a patent may contain a provision
requiring arbitration of any dispute relating to patent validity or infringement arising
under the contract. In the absence of such a provision, the parties to an existing patent
validity or infringement dispute may agree in writing to settle such dispute by arbitration.
Any such provision or agreement shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except for
any grounds that exist at law or in equity for revocation of a contract.
Section 294(a) makes the arbitrability issue clear and makes the
agreement to arbitrate binding. The pairing of validity and infringement is a
logical one in patent disputes, as invalidity is a common defense against a
claim of breach of license agreement. A U.S. patent licensee cannot be
prevented from claiming invalidity of a patent via contractual provisions as a
matter of public policy.7 9 It is therefore of central importance that these
related issues can be arbitrated. 80  The antitrust issue was, and still is,
regarded by some as a serious one, as the American Safety81 case
73. See Cavicchi v. Mohawk Mfg. Co., 27 F. Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y 1939). See also Edmund H.
O'Brien, Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements in Infringement Disputes, 22 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 289 (1940).
74. See Briner, supra note 67, at 289.
75. Amito S. Muskat, Alternatives to Court Litigation in Intellectual Property Disputes:
Binding Arbitration and/or Mediation - Patent and Non-patent Issues, 22 IDEA 271, 273 (1982).
76. See id. at 273.
77. See id. at 274.
78. Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-247, 96 Stat. 317 (1982) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 294 (1988)).
79. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
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demonstrates. There, a patent and trademark license contained a provision
that required all disputes to be resolved via arbitration. The Court of
Appeals held that the district court that first encountered the issue must first
decide the antitrust issue before sending the issue to arbitration.82 Following
that case, American courts were unwilling to allow antitrust issues to be
arbitrated until the landmark Mitsubishi case.8 3 In this case the Supreme
Court determined that it would allow the parties' arbitration agreement to
stand, even though the issue involved federal antitrust issues.84 While the
Court did not apply this reasoning to domestic antitrust issues, subsequent
case law has extended the scope.85
These changes now allow parties the freedom to agree to arbitrate issues
that would have been considered by a federal court. This issue may come
into play particularly if the arbitration agreement stipulates that all disputes
arising from the contract will be arbitrated. However, the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals has stated that it will not allow arbitration to take place in
IP disputes that involve unfair competition, including issues involving
imports.86 That issue would be considered by a U.S. administrative agency
such as the International Trade Commission (ITC). 87
The new legislation also stipulates that the public must be made aware
of the nature of the award.88 The award will only be binding and
enforceable when notice of the award is filed with the United States Patent
Office (USPTO). 89 This provides public notice of an award, but, as in most
jurisdictions where arbitration of patent issues is involved, the decision only
has inter partes effect. 90 Invalidity is only considered as part of contractual
rights and obligations. This may seem to be a somewhat artificial
construction, yet, it is necessary to keep the prerogative of the state intact.
Patent rights in the state of registration remain intact against other parties.
This also leads to a particular strength of arbitration of patent disputes in the
United States: a negative decision does not result in the total loss of rights.
This is a major difference between arbitration and litigation. The most
straightforward way of challenging an infringement suit is to raise the issue
of invalidity. This can be done by a defendant in an ex parte proceeding
82. Id. at 826-27.
83. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 623 n.10 (1985).
84. Id. at 640; see generally The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2007).
85. Thomas J. Brewer, The Arbitrability of Antitrust Disputes: Freedom to Contract for an
Alternative Forum, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 91, 99 (1998).
86. Farrel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 949 F.2d 1147, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
87. Id. at 1152.
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with the USPTO called a re-examination. 9' If successful, this action would
clear the defendant of any liability. The grounds for finding a patent invalid
include fraudulent information supplied in the application, anti-competitive
business practices, or lack of novelty and non-obviousness. 92 The last two
factors are considered in a re-examination, and new evidence that had not
previously considered by the USPTO can be considered. The court can
order that the patent be restricted in scope or invalidated. Thus, an important
issue for arbitration is how far the arbitrators can go when considering
claims.
Recent case law has enforced arbitration clauses in patent disputes, even
when the arbitrators did not understand claim construction in the same way
as a court would have. 93 Enforcement of arbitration clauses removed fears
that many patent cases could not be arbitrated due to public interest. The
U.S. Supreme Court has even limited the ability of states to circumvent
arbitration by statute. 94  The situation in Switzerland is even more
favourable to arbitration. The Federal Office of Intellectual Property9 5
decided that arbitral tribunals may decide upon the validity of patents,
trademarks, and designs. Other registered IP rights may also be challenged
on the basis of an arbitral award.
Switzerland is a rather extreme example. In contrast, most nations allow
an arbitral tribunal to decide on infringement, while the validity of a
registration must be challenged in court. This follows the reasoning of the
Blonder-Tongue case,9 6where the court noted that an arbitration award that
challenged the validity of a patent would allow an accused infringer to
charge a price for the patented product just below the price of competitors
who would pay royalties. 97 They could also charge a price above that if the
patent was unenforceable. 98 This would clearly be damaging to the long
term interests of fair competition.99
91. See 35 U.S.C. § 301.
92. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (1952).
93. Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
94. The FAA is used to trump state legislation. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517
U.S. 681 (1996).
95. Federal Office of Intellectual Property in its decision of 15 December 1975. Briner, supra
note 67, §2.2.2 n.25.
96. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 346-47 (1971).
97. Id. at 346.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 346-47.
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The issue of arbitrability may arise at the beginning of an arbitration as a
challenge to jurisdiction. This can be considered by the tribunal or it can be
considered by a court. The primary consideration for a court would be to
apply any mandatory laws. An arbitral tribunal may not be as concerned
with this consideration. The issue can also be raised again at the
enforcement stage. According to Article V(2)(a) of the New York
Convention (NYC),'00 a national court at the place of enforcement of the
award may refuse to cooperate if the dispute cannot be arbitrated according
to national law.'01 This has been cited as the weakest link in the chain of
international arbitration, as local concerns can frustrate international
judgments. However, it is very rare for an award to be denied under ArticleV(2). 102
V. ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS
Institutional arbitration is administered by an institution under its own
rules. The goal is for a central organization to offer rules and different levels
of quality control.10 3  United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules (United Nations Commission on
Trading Law)'04 can be used for arbitrations under no institutional rules,
which are termed ad hoc. 105 In contrast, arbitrations under institutional rules
can be termed institutional. 10 6  The institutes have rules that can differ
substantially. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is known to
have prescriptive rules.'0 7 Article 3 of Appendix III of the ICC Rules10
allows the ICC to act as an appointing authority for ad hoc arbitration under,
for example, UNCITRAL Rules. Some other institutional rules have similar
100. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, United
Nations, June 10, 1958, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-
conv/XXIllle.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2009) [hereinafter NYC].
101. NYC, supra note 100, art. V(2)(a); see also Hanotiau, infra note 102, at 36.
102. Bernard Hanotiau, Objective Arbitrability, its Limits, its Problem Areas, in 6 OBJECTIVE
ARBITRABILITY-ANTITRUST DISPUTES-INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES 26, 36 (Blessing
ed., 1994).
103. William K. Slate II, International Arbitration: Do Institutions Make a Difference? 31
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 41, 45 (1996).




106. See Slate 11, supra note 103, at 47.
107. See generally id.
108. Int'l Chamber of Commerce [ICC] Rules of Arbitration, at app. 111, art. 3 1998,
http://www.jus.uio.no/Im/icc.arbitration.rules. 1998/doc.html. (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
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provisions. However, this would not in itself qualify an arbitration as
institutional.
Certain functions that are normally reserved for an arbitrator, such as the
determination of the validity of the arbitration agreement, are the
responsibility of the ICC. 109 The institution also reviews all awards to
ensure they can be legally enforced." In an ICC case dealing with a
contract between an Italian and a Korean company, even before determining
the law of contract, the tribunal required an ex officio determination of the
competition rules of the states where the award was to be enforced."' This
was clearly intended as a means to avoid conflict with national competition
law, which can vary greatly between nations. Other arbitral institutions do
not have such control over the final award. Indeed, some parties may prefer
the tribunal to consider an award without considering enforcement issues.
This is because even an unenforceable judgment may be useful for insurance
purposes or to demonstrate to investors or competitors the strength of their
IP rights.
The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) was founded as
the London Chamber of Arbitration in 1892.112 Members of the
organization are drawn from major trading nations. LCIA Rules 13 are
written for clarity using a minimum of jargon. They are broadly based and
do not address the needs of patent arbitration in particular. The World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) also has a mediation and
arbitration center in Geneva. WIPO rules are specifically designed for IP
issues. 114 They were originally based on UNCITRAL Rules, but they have
been tailored to deliver a higher degree of confidentiality, as well as provide
specific procedures for IP. 5 For example, articles forty-nine through fifty-
one govern the use of technical and experimental evidence." 16  Similar
109. See Slate II, supra note 103, at 47.
110. See id.
111. Yves Derains, L 'ordre Public et le Droit Applicable au Ford du Litige dans L 'arbitrage
International, 3 REV. ARB. 375, 397-400 (1986).
112. London Ct. of Int'l Arbitration, www.lcia.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
113. The London Court of International Arbitration Rules [LCIA], 1998, available at
http://www.lcia.org/ARB-folder/ARBDOWNLOADS/ENGLISH/ruies.pdf (last visited Mar. 10,
2009).
114. Julia A. Martin, Note, Arbitrating in the Alps Rather Than Litigating in Los Angeles: The
Advantages of International Intellectual Property-Specific Alternative Dispute Resolution, 49 STAN.
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provisions are not found in arbitral rules designed for general commercial
arbitration.11 7  The combination of an IP focus and an international
reputation have led some commentators to suggest that WIPO should be
considered the institution of choice for IP disputes. 8
Specialist IP arbitration rules besides WIPO have been formed. The
AAA had special Patent Arbitration Rules (PAR) that were last amended on
September 1, 2007. Patent disputes are now administered under the AAA's
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (CAR)" 9 and the
Supplementary Rules for the Resolution of Patent Disputes (AAA
Supplementary Rules). 120  The latter deals with the preliminary hearing.
Because the PAR has only recently been replaced, it will be given some
attention here. The AAA also has an international arm, established in 1996,
called the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) which has
offices in Dublin and Mexico City. 12' There are also special rules for this
body, called the International Dispute Resolution Procedures (IDRP). 122
Several small specialized arbitral institutions have also been founded
recently. In 2003, the Arab Intellectual Property Mediation and Arbitration
Society was formed in Jordan to deal with Jordanian, as well as the wider
Arab, IP arbitration. 123  The main reason cited for the formation of this
centre is that there are no judges who are well versed in this field, and there
is an increasing need to settle these disputes. 124 China has also, as of 2007,
formed an IP arbitration centre in Xiamen. 125  Rules and procedures are
being formulated, and special attention is paid to party choice in selecting
117. Id. at964-65.
118. Id. at963-65.
119. Am. Arbitration Ass. [AAA] Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures
(2007), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440&printable--true (last visited Mar. 10,
2009).
120. Am. Arbitration Ass. [AAA] Resolution of Patent Disputes Supplementary Rules (2006),
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=27417 (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
121. See About The International Centre for Dispute Resolution, available at
http://www.adr.org/abouticdr (last visited Mar. 10, 2009) (discussing its establishment and areas of
expertise).
122. International Dispute Resolution Procedures (2008), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994 (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
123. Lama Alabseh, Creation of Arab Center Specialized in Arbitrating IP Conflicts in Jordan
(ADDUSTOUR NEWSPAPER, Aug. 15, 2003, available at http://tagorg-
theinstitution.com/UserPages/demo news.aspx?id=l 071 &q=&lang=en (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
124. Id.
125. International Property Protection in China, Mainland China's First IP Arbitration Center
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arbitrators. 26  These latter two institutions are clearly aimed at serving
linguistic groups that may not be comfortable in arbitration abroad.
However, it remains to be seen how successful these linguistically focused
IP arbitration centres will be. The fact that they have no specific reputations
in arbitration may significantly decrease their attractiveness in an
increasingly international environment. At the same time major arbitral
institutions have growing lists of arbitrators with skills in many languages. 1
27
VI. EVIDENCE
Evidence is a broad issue, but as a rule patent arbitrations differ from
other commercial arbitrations in several respects. Because arbitration is not
bound by rules of evidence, as is a court, many kinds of evidence may be
allowed. In arbitration it is up to the tribunal to decide what evidence is
used, but in general there are three different kinds: documents, witnesses,
and expert evidence. Special attention is devoted to documents and experts.
For example, a patent case could involve special documents such as
correspondence with a patent agent, which could be claimed as privileged.
Discovery, the level of disclosure of the existence of documents, differs
greatly between jurisdictions. The issues of confidentiality and discovery
are related, so they are easily considered together.
Experts may also emerge as a critical issue in patent cases. Unlike most
commercial disputes, which may take place using documents alone, patent
cases may involve material evidence. This evidence may not be amenable to
examination by arbitrators who are not skilled in some technical field.
Experiments may be required to determine the facts. An expert may have to
be appointed, and the expert has to have access to the evidence. Because
arbitration is a private method of dispute resolution, these issues can be
determined by the parties. Institutional rules may consider these issues in
detail, or may leave the issue to be decided by the tribunal as the need arises.
The end of the section considers if more stringent rules of evidence would be
beneficial or detrimental to patent arbitration.
126. Id.
127. See generally Slate 11, supra note 103, at 50.
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A. Documents
Various legal traditions have different norms as to what is considered
privileged material. Some documents may be claimed as privileged. A
good example is the communication between a patent agent and a client.
The nature of protection in this case is based on a relationship and not the
information itself. 128 Arbitrators cannot themselves examine evidence that
has been claimed as privileged. 129  If a tribunal did examine privileged
evidence, this could lead to the award being set aside. 30 The core principles
of communication and contradiction require that arbitrators do not consider
evidence that is not available to the other party. 3 ' Instead, with the consent
of the parties, an advisor could be appointed by the arbitrators to examine
the evidence and suggest if it should be admitted. The party that asserts the
privilege could still refuse to accept the recommendation. In some
jurisdictions, however, assenting to this procedure might be considered a
waiver. It would, therefore, appear to be a better option for the asserting
party to continuously assert the privilege in order to be sure of retaining it. 131
Many institutional rules provide that the tribunal can draw negative
inferences if a party does not produce evidence and does not provide a
satisfactory explanation. 3  It would be up to the tribunal to decide if
continuing to claim a privilege would be a satisfactory explanation. '14 There
may be cases where a party may want to continue to assert privilege even if
a negative inference is drawn. A party who desires to override the privilege
may request-depending upon national law-that the arbitrators grant
permission for court assistance in obtaining evidence from a recalcitrant
party.' This can include compulsion or hearing a witness under oath. 136
The final decision of the arbitrators cannot be appealed. 1
3 7
128. Information itself may also be claimed to be privileged. The information, such as a trade
secret, could be exploited by a competitor if released. See PATRICIA SHAUGHNESSY, ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMERICAN, SWEDISH, AND EC LAW 255 (2001).




132. See SHAUGHNESSY, supra note 128, at 316.
133. See IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration, art.
9(4) note 77 (1999), available at http://www.asser.n/ica/documents/cms-ica_4_1_IBA-ROE2.pdf
(last visited Mar. 10, 2009) [hereinafter IBA rules].
134. See id. at art. 9.2.
135. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration art. 27 (2006),
available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/arbitration/1985Modelarbitration.html
[hereinafter Model Law] (amending 1985).
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Assuming that the issue of privilege is not raised, the next issue is
perhaps even more important in most IP arbitrations. How many documents
are required to support or refute a case? Discovery costs for a patent case
may easily reach or exceed one million dollars. 3 8 The greater the amount of
discovery, the more likely there will be further questions that require further
documents. In contrast discovery can, in conjunction with the other party,
be limited in arbitration. 39 Otherwise, this issue is dealt with in different
ways in various jurisdictions. 140 As a rule, common law jurisdictions
provide for full disclosure of documents. '41 Civil law courts, in contrast,
favour limited, specific discovery. 142 These differences are also reflected in
arbitration, as each side enters into arbitration with a set of cultural factors
that influence procedure.' 43 Common law arbitration practice allows the
parties and the tribunal to decide the level of disclosure required. Civil law
jurisdictions allow the parties to agree, but the tribunal has no powers to
order discovery.'44 This can be supplemented by the power of courts to
intervene to assist a tribunal, as in Sweden. 145  The SCC Rules, 146 article
26(3) states that the tribunal has authority to order production of documents
or other evidence.
Permanent arbitral institutions differ significantly as to how discovery is
handled. The ICC Rules contain no specific mention of discovery, but
article 20(5) states that at any time during the proceedings, the tribunal,
"may summon any party to provide additional evidence."' 147  The LCIA
Rules, article 22.1 also states the tribunal can order a party to produce
136. See IBA Rules, supra note 133, art. 9.2.
137. See, e.g., Model Law, supra note 135, art. 27.
138. Douglas Doskocil, Knowing Your Toolset: How to Use ADR to Your Advantage During
Patent Litigation, 44 IDEA 247, 249 (2004).
139. See, e.g., Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures art. L-3(c) (2007).
140. See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 108, arts. 20-21.
141. See W. Scott Simpson & Omer Kesikli, The Countours ofArbitration Discovery, 67 ALA.
LAW. 280 (2006).
142. Id. at 281-82.
143. Id.
144. Simpson & Kesikli, supra note 141; CAR, supra note 139, art. L-3(c).
145. For the situation in Sweden, see HEUMAN, supra note 129, at 446-47.
146. Arbitration Rules of the SCC art. 26(3) (2007), available at
http://www.sccinstitute.com/-upload/shared-files/regler/2007-Arbitration-Rules.eng.pdf (last
visited Mar. 10, 2009).
147. ICC Rules, supra note 108, art. 20(5).
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documents or classes of documents. 148 The International Bar Association
(IBA) Rules of Evidence 149 generally follows the permanent arbitral
institutions in that a tribunal can order a party to produce documents, but
without coercive power. The tribunal can, however, draw negative
inferences if the documents are deemed to be relevant. 150 UNCITRAL
Rules, Article 24(3) allows a tribunal to require the production of
documents, exhibits, or other evidence.' 5' There is no mention of
coercion. 15
2
Arbitral discovery in America is distinctive. The PAR allowed the
arbitrators to issue subpoenas. 153 This is quite innovative when compared to
the rules of other arbitral institutions. 154 Section 30 stated that:
The parties may offer such evidence as is relevant and material to the dispute and shall
produce such evidence as the arbitrator may deem necessary to an understanding and
determination of the dispute. An arbitrator or other person authorized by law to subpoena
witnesses or documents may do so upon the request of any party or independently, with
notice to all parties. 155
The current CAR are much the same. 156 CAR rule 3 1(a) states that the
parties may offer such evidence as is relevant and material.' Rule 3 1(d)
states who can issue a subpoena for witnesses or documents with no change
from the PAR.158  However, the PAR did not consider the issue of
confidentiality. "9 CAR rule 31(c) states: "The arbitrator shall take into
account applicable principles of legal privilege, such as those involving the
confidentiality of communications between [a] lawyer and client."' 160
Protecting this relationship would make the relationship between patent
examiner and client also confidential. This is an important divergence that
limits discovery. 161
148. LCIA Rules, supra note 112, art. 22.1.
149. IBA Rules, supra note 133, art. 3.4-5.
150. IBA Rules, supra note 133, art. 9.4.
151. Model Law, supra note 63, art. 24(3).
152. Id. at art. 24.
153. Patent Arbitration Rules § 30 (2005).
154. See, e.g., Model Law, supra note 63, art. 27; ICC Rules, supra note 108, art. 20.
155. PAR, supra note 153, § 30.
156. See Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (2007).
157. Id. at R. 31(a).
158. CAR, supra note 156, R. 31(d); PAR, supra note 153, § 30.
159. PAR, supra note 153.
160. CAR, supra note 156, R. 31(c).
161. Tom Brody, Duty to Disclose: Dayco Products v. Total Containment, 7 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 369 (2008).
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The subpoenas are enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) if
the seat of the arbitration is in the United States.1 62  An arbitrator can
subpoena witnesses and documents under threat of contempt if the
arbitrator's subpoena is not complied with. 163 The AAA arbitration rules are
specifically written with this legislation in mind. 164 The IDRP Rules
consider the issue of evidence in article 19. No mention is made of
subpoenas, but it does state that the tribunal may order parties to produce
other documents. In one unreported ICC case a tribunal refused to issue a
section 7 subpoena against a foreign national to produce documents. The
tribunal held that because the dispute had no connection with the United
States, and parties did not contemplate the exercise of this power when they
entered into the arbitration agreement, they could not issue a subpoena. 1
65
Arbitrators have also been able to order subpoenas to produce third
party documents. 166  Even if a section 7 subpoena is not issued, it is a
powerful inducement that can remain in the arsenal. However, it should be
noted that this provision is not unique. The UNCITRAL Model Law states
in article 27 that the tribunal or a party with approval of the tribunal can
request for a competent court to assist in taking evidence. The English
Arbitration Act 167 also states in section 43(1) that a party may use the same
court procedures in legal proceedings to secure a witness or to produce
documents or other material evidence.
The AAA Supplementary Rules deal specifically with the preliminary
hearing. 168  During this hearing, according to rule 3(c)(3), for the party
claiming and the party opposing infringement, an initial disclosure must be
made regarding "any document relating to these contentions.' 169  These
issues were not addressed in the previous PAR, which in its rule 9 dealt with
the issue of the preliminary hearing in a very cursory manner. 170  The
162. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1994).
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., PAR, supra note 153; CAR, supra note 156.
165. See ALAN REDFERN, ET AL., Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration
403 (4th ed. 2004).
166. See Meadows Indem. Co. v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 157 F.R.D. 42 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
167. Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23 (Eng) available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts1996/ukpga_19960023enI (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
168. See Supplementary Rules, supra note 120, Supplementary Rules for the Resolution of
Patent Disputes (c).
169. See id. at (c)(9).
170. See PAR, supra note 153, § 9.
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Supplementary Rules also deal specifically with the issue of discovery.17'
Section 3(i) states: "the extent to which discovery, if any, shall be permitted
and the procedure and time frame for the discovery."' 72 This clearly states
that the parties may or may not engage in the process of discovery, and if
they do, it can be limited by agreement.
Institutional rules vary considerably in how they approach evidence.' 73
Here it appears that the IBA Rules of Evidence had an appreciable impact.174
In order to avoid doubt, parties are advised to specifically agree that the
arbitration will be conducted according to IBA rules.175 However, the rules
can be adopted after the formation of the tribunal, and the rules can be varied
or used as a guideline by the parties or the tribunal. 1
7 6
B. Experts
Because arbitration is characterized as a process that does not rely upon
formal rules of evidence, the selection of arbitrators does not depend upon
legal training.177 This allows the parties to select experts in particular fields
to act as arbitrators who are neither former judges nor litigators.178 The pool
of arbitrators is larger than it would be if legal training was required.
179
However, without some indication of the criteria used for determining what
kinds of evidence will be admitted and what will be excluded, uncertainty
can be injected into a process that is controlled by the parties. 8 ° The two
parties may come to an arbitration from differing legal backgrounds and
have divergent expectations. A "battle of experts" may ensue, as both sides
try to introduce numbers of specialists to raise or counter factual issues. The
legal issues can become submerged in facts. However, litigation is also not
immune to this phenomenon. 181 Junk science is particularly an issue where
171. See Supplementary Rules, supra note 120, Supplementary Rules for the Resolution of
Patent Disputes (c).
172. See id.
173. See, e.g., IBA Rules, supra note 133.
174. See Terry F. Peppard, New International Evidence Rules Advance Arbitration Process, 73
Wis. LAW 18 (2000).
175. David W. Rivkin, Foreward to IBA Rules, at 1 (1999).
176. See IBA Rules, supra note 133, pmbl. para. 2.
177. See Kenneth B. Clark & William A. Fenwick, Structuring an Arbitration Agreement for
High Technology Disputes, 9 COMPUTER LAW 22, 24 (1992).
178. See id. at 24.
179. Id. at 23-24.
180. Id. at 24.
181. Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About Scientific
Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror "Incompetence" and Scientific "Objectivity, " 25 CONN. L. REV.
1083, 1084-85 (1993).
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jurors are involved, as they may lack the technical training required to
discern a charlatan from a real scientist. 18 2 In an arbitration one or more
arbitrators can be selected for their specialist knowledge, thereby potentially
at least making non-mainstream science less of an issue. A panel of three
arbitrators also leaves open the possibility that at least one member of the
panel could be a specialist in evidentiary matters.
As a general rule, it appears that it is usual for a tribunal to have the
power to appoint experts. 183 This power would depend upon the absence of
provisions in the governing law or an agreement between the parties to the
contrary. 184 The expert would be needed in order to understand technical
issues, and would not take on the powers of another arbitrator.'85 The
tribunal may or may not consult the parties in their choice of expert.'86
The PAR do not treat the issue of experts in detail. PAR section 28
provides that parties can present witnesses and material and relevant
evidence. 187 It also states that exhibits, when offered by either party, may be
received into evidence. 8 8 Here, it appears experts are to be determined by
the parties and are considered as "witnesses."' 189 The rules do not address
the issue of an expert examining evidence per se, but it is implied.' 90 The
CAR, rule 30 notes that the parties can present evidence to support their
claim or defense, and that witnesses shall submit to questions from the
arbitrator and adverse parties.' 9' The issue of experts is unclear from these
rules. 192  However, the Supplementary Rules note in rule c(12) that the
following may be considered at the preliminary hearing: "the identification
and the availability of witnesses, including experts, and such matters with
respect to witnesses including their biographies and expected testimony..."
Rule 3(m) deals with the exchange of expert reports.' 93 The first point to
182. Id. at 1091.
183. REDFERN ET AL., supra note 165, at 309.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 367.
186. Id. at 310.




191. CAR, supra note 156, R.30(a).
192. Id. at R.30-33.
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draw from these rules is that an expert is considered a kind of witness.
While the issue of testimony is considered, there is no detailed consideration
of expert examination of evidence. '94
The IDRP Rules deal specifically with experts.' 95 Article 22(1) states:
"The tribunal may appoint one or more independent experts to report to it, in
writing, on specific issues designated by the tribunal and communicated to
the parties."' 196 This gives the tribunal the power to appoint independent
experts as well as to direct their attention to specific issues. '97 Article 22(2)
states: "The parties shall provide such an expert with any relevant
information or produce for inspection any relevant documents or goods that
the expert may require. Any dispute between a party and the expert as to the
relevance of the requested information or goods shall be referred to the
tribunal for decision."' 198 This stipulates that the expert must be assisted by
the parties. 99 This issue might be particularly important in a patent dispute
where the subject of the dispute is technical. The tribunal is not in a position
itself to experiment, while an expert could be. It is essential that the expert
is provided with appropriate evidence, such as samples. According to the
AAA, patent disputes are to be resolved with the Supplementary Rules along
with the CAR.z00 In this case it appears the ICDR Rules are to be preferred
in that they are clearer.
ICC rules do not grant the tribunal authority to appoint experts on its
own.
2 0
' Article 20(3) states that the experts are to be appointed by the
parties. 02 Article 20(4) states that the tribunal may, after consulting the
parties, appoint one or more experts, define their terms of reference, and
203 A hmay receive their reports. At the request of the other party, the parties
shall be given the opportunity to question any such expert appointed by the
tribunal.20 4  The ICC Rules leave much more power in the hands of the
194. Supplementary Rules, supra note 120, Supplementary Rules for the Resolution of Patent
Disputes (c).
195. See IDRP, supra note 122, art. 22.
196. Id. at art. 22(l).
197. Id.
198. Id. at art. 22(2).
199. Id.
200. Supplementary Rules, supra note 120, Supplementary Rules for the Resolution of Patent
Disputes (a).
201. See ICC Rules, supra note 108, art. 20.
202. Id. at art. 20(3).
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parties. It is also clear that the ICC Rules do not specifically note what form
evidence can take. In this case the WIPO Rules are far more specific.20 5
Article 48(b) of the WIPO Rules states that either at the request of a
party or via its own motion, a tribunal may order documents or other
evidence to be made available to the tribunal or to an expert.2 0 6 The expert
may be appointed by the tribunal, and the evidence may be put in the
possession or control of the expert for inspection or testing.20 7 This broad
rule covers all kinds of evidence, not just documents.20 8 WIPO Rules clearly
foresee a situation where an expert is needed to examine evidence. 20 9 The
WIPO Rules even envisage the issue of a battle of experts and propose a
method to reduce what could be a very adversarial process.210
Article 55(d) of the WIPO Rules states:
The opinion of any expert on the issue or issues submitted to the expert shall be subject to
the Tribunal's power of assessment of those issues in the context of all the circumstances
of the case, unless the parties have agreed that the expert's determination shall be
conclusive in respect of any specific issue.
21 1
The parties can present and question an expert. This is an important
consideration, but hardly unique. For example, the LCIA Rules212 provide
in article 22(d) a comprehensive power "to order any party to make any
property, site or thing under its control and relating to the subject matter of
the arbitration available for inspection by the Arbitral Tribunal, any other
party, its expert or any expert to the Arbitral Tribunal." Where the WIPO
rules go further is if the issue is not contentious, the parties can agree to
accept it as fact. 213 This process is not defined in other institutional rules,
although it may exist in practice.
205. See WIPO Arbitration Rules, available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/rules/
(last visited Mar. 10, 2009) [hereinafter WIPO Rules].
206. Id. at art. 48(b).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at art. 48-49.
210. Id. at art. 53-55.
211. See WIPO Rules, supra note 205, art. 55(d).
212. LCIA Arbitration Rules, supra note 113, art. 22.1(d).
213. See WIPO Rules, supra note 205, art. 55(d).
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During the arbitration, both parties must be allowed an opportunity to
present their case. If one party can furnish proof2 14 that they were not given
a fair hearing, a court can deny or vacate the arbitral award according to
article V(l)(b) of the NYC.2 5 In the Generica case,2 16 the court of appeals
reviewed a district court's decision confirming an arbitral award. The court
found that there was no reason to suppose that the curtailed cross
examination of the witness would have changed the outcome of the
arbitration.117 The arbitrators are not bound to hear all evidence, but only
evidence they consider relevant.218 The court found there was no evidence
of procedural unfairness in the Generica case.219 If, for example, the
tribunal had changed evidentiary rules during a hearing which prevented a
party from presenting evidence, the situation would be different.22°
C. Stringent Rules of Evidence?
Some commentators have suggested that the Federal Rules of
Evidence22' should be used in arbitrations.222 According to this view, such
rules will lead to greater predictability, preclude immaterial evidence, and
reduce "surprises. 223  The latter problem is an issue in arbitration. The
often long period of discovery-as in litigation-usually does not take place.224
For this reason, some suggest changes should be made to the Federal rules to
suit them to arbitration. As one scholar has suggested:
First, reports from experts expected to testify at the arbitration hearing must be submitted
to the arbitrator, preferably prior to the date of the arbitration hearing. Second, parties
must be permitted, perhaps even required, to submit summaries of testimony to be
offered, and these summaries should be entered into evidence in lieu of reading in
depositions. Finally, the hearsay rules must be relaxed to allow some evidence such as
214. "'Proof' has been defined as being heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545,552, 85 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (1965)).
215. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, United
Nations, June 10, 1958, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-
conv/XXIllle.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2009) [hereinafter NYC].
216. Generica Ltd. v. Pharm. Basics, Inc., 125 F.3d 1123, 1129(7th Cir. 1997).
217. Id. at 1131.
218. Id. at 1130.
219. Id.
220. Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 1992).
221. FED. R. EVID. 2008.
222. Paradise, supra note 5, at 273.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 276.
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reports, documents, and some testimony, to be admitted without following all of the
costly procedures for authenticating such items. 
225
However, hearsay evidence must be corroborated through other
evidence or other non-hearsay evidence. 2 6  After these changes, the
commentator proposes that the revised rules should be incorporated into
arbitration agreements as well as into institutional rules.
227
While allowing that the introduction of stringent rules of evidence
might, in some circumstances, be appropriate, it could also introduce
complexity that would lead to increased time and cost. 228  Arbitration is
favoured over litigation, particularly in patent related issues, because of time
and cost factors. 229  The Federal Rules of Evidence are designed so that
misleading evidence does not confuse a lay jury. This is not an issue in
arbitration. 3 ° Without strict rules of evidence, the parties can "educate"
arbitrators in the technical matter in dispute.2 t For example, in the IBM v.
Fujitsu arbitration, the parties held seminars offered by specialists. 23 2 Under
Federal Rules of Evidence in a trial, this would have been effectively
impossible.
Such a system of seminars would not, of course, make the arbitrators
experts in particular fields of technology, but may acquaint them with the
main issues of the dispute. As long as the parties agree among themselves
the form this education should take-keeping in mind that each party should
have a right to present relevant points-this appears to be a very creative way
of dealing with this problem. No matter how technically astute, even a
specialist may be unfamiliar with new technology. Another option is for the
experts from each side to be heard simultaneously.23 3 They can be seated
opposite or alongside each other facing the tribunal and they can be asked to
comment and respond to the opinions of others.3 4 This kind of flexibility is
225. Id. at 274.
226. Id. at 278.
227. See Paradise, supra note 5 at 274.
228. Id. at 261-62, 274.
229. Id. at 276-77.
230. Id. at 270-72.
231. Id. at 272.
232. IBM v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. 13T-1 17-0636-85 American Arb. Ass'n Comm. Arb. Trib. 4
(1987).
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a feature of arbitration and can be used to good effect.2 35 The information
can be compared immediately, and the experts can debate the issue "among
themselves," leaving the arbitrators to more easily reach a judgment.236
While it may appear at first that a lack of evidentiary rules hinders
arbitration, there is no evidence to suggest that technically complicated
arbitrations suffer from a "battle of experts" more than litigation does.
"Junk science" can be introduced into court even with rules of evidence, but
in the case of an arbitration, there is no need to worry about a technically
2371 hhandicapped jury deciding the issues. With the selection of appropriate
arbitrators who can decide on the value of evidence, there appears to be little
need for mandatory rules.238 It is the responsibility of both parties to ensure
that the panel is capable of making an accurate assessment. As the need
arises, a tribunal may also introduce rules or guidelines by which they will
assess evidence.239 Upon closer examination, the blanket imposition of
detailed rules on the arbitral process may hinder rather than assist arbitrators
in reaching a decision.24° This is particularly the case for intellectual
property issues that may encompass a broad range of evidence.
VII. CONFIDENTIALITY
Confidentiality refers to the disclosure of information presented or
prepared for arbitration. Apart from the issue of confidentiality in
arbitration, IP licenses often contain a confidentiality clause that will persist
through the termination of the license.24' Such protected information would
remain confidential in the arbitration as well. 242 This would likely not affect
other issues. The identity of certain clients and sales figures might be
considered confidential. The interpretation of the licensee's obligations may
not be.243 Confidentiality in an IP arbitration is potentially of critical
importance, but it is a double-edged sword.
On the one side, products or processes in dispute may not have their IP
rights fully protected at the time of the dispute. An IP holder may not
235. ld. at 312-13.
236. Id. at 313.
237. Paradise, supra note 5, at 272.
238. Id.
239. See generally REDFERN ET AL., supra note 165, at 309.
240. Paradise, supra note 5, at 273.
241. Julian D.M. Lew, The Arbitration of Intellectual Property Disputes, available at
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even want the existence of a dispute with a licensor to be known.
2 45
Confidentiality would therefore be appreciated as a critical feature.146  On
the other side, if the arbitration is confidential, it may not be possible for
parties to use any part of the proceedings in a subsequent court action. 47
The nature of confidentiality depends upon what the parties have agreed
upon. 245
For example, it is possible to specify the form of the award.249
Arbitrators can be required to decide a narrow issue in the dispute, for
instance, specifying the figure owed from one party to another, without
specifying the reasons.250 This may be of particular interest to those who
would want to limit the diffusion of an adverse award, in case it is known
that a patent would not withstand scrutiny.25 1  This is essentially
confidentiality by a "back door" contractual method.252 If no agreement was
reached, confidentiality would depend upon the rules the parties designated
to govern the dispute.253 Only if neither party has adequately covered the
issue is the law of the forum applied.254 The issue can be summarized that
the parties cannot take for granted that arbitration will be confidential.255




247. Lew, supra note 241.
248. Id.
249. REDFERN ET AL., supra note 165, at 379.
250. See id. at 374-75. It is possible under the English Arbitration Act of 1996, section 69(l),
to dispense with the reasons for the award. This is also considered to be an agreement to exclude an
appeal to a court on a point of law. See Andrew Tweeddale & Keren Tweeddale, Arbitration of
Commercial Disputes: International and English Law and Practice, 867 (Oxford 2007).
251. Lew, supra note 241.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See L.Y. Fortier, The Occasionally Unwarranted Assumption of Confidentiality, 15 ARB.
INT'L 131 (1999).
255. This is following the reasoning in the case Esso Austriali Resources Ltd. v. The
Honourable Sidney James Plowman 183 CLR 10 (1995). The Austrian court held that the
requirement to conduct the case in camera did not prohibit disclosure of documents and information
from the arbitration. This was particularly the case for public authorities, but it remains to be seen if
this reasoning is applied in other cases in different countries. Id.
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Arbitrators do not have a duty of confidentiality in some jurisdictions.
This is the case in the United States,25 6 England257 and Germany."5 8
Interestingly, the English Arbitration Act 259 does not mention the issue. It
has been left to be defined by the common law. The situation is different in
Sweden, where there is a duty to confidentiality but there are no provisions
for legal sanctions. 6° In the United States the issue of confidentiality is
linked with issues of invalidity of a patent. 35 U.S.C. section 294 states that
if the issue is raised by the defendant, an arbitrator is obliged to consider
invalidity. 26' The arbitration itself is confidential, but the statute specifies
that the parties must give written notice of the award to the USPTO.262 The
notice must state if the invalidity was considered in arbitration.263 The
notice is available to the public. 2 6 If in the course of proceedings the patent
was found to be invalid, challenges from other parties-either via arbitration
or litigation-are possible. 265 An arbitral award is similar to a court judgment
in its res judicata effect for those issues covered by the award.2 66  To
counter this problem, a patentee may draft a specific arbitration clause that
states the defendant will not raise the issue of invalidity in an arbitration
covered under the agreement. 
2 67
In U.S. litigation, the issue of confidential information is covered by
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.268 This section provides
for protective orders that can limit the scope of discovery or prohibit the
public disclosure of information. 269 The requesting party must demonstrate
"good cause" and must show that there was an effort made to resolve the
dispute without court action. 270 The information, if disclosed, must cause a
very serious injury to business interests, which must be demonstrated for
256. Gramling v. Food Machinery and Chemical Co., 151 F. Supp. 853, 860-61 (W.D.S.C.
1957).
257. Roylance v. General Medical Council [2000] 1 A.C. 311 (P.C. 1999).
258. Supreme Court 1930 (RG 2 129).
259. See Arbitration Act 1996, supra note 167, available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts996/ukpga_1 9960023 en I (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
260. Svea Court of Appeal, T8735/01, 6 September 2002, Czech Republic v. CME.




265. The patent may still be enforced against non-parties to the arbitration. See 35 U.S.C. §
294(c)(2002).
266. Am. Renaissance Lines, Inc. v. Saxis S.S. Co., 502 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir. 1974).
267. See Koppikar, supra note 10, at 167.
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every item of confidential information.27' In practice this is a very high
standard to meet.272
The FAA 273 does not address the issue of confidentiality. The AAA
rules (PAR and CAR) do not consider the issue specifically, though as noted
before, CAR Rule 31(c) deals with preserving the confidential nature of a
relationship.274 The PAR Supplemental Rules state in rule (c)(1) that the
preliminary hearing may include the execution of a confidentiality
agreement.2"5 The fact that it is first on the list is suggestive of the relative
importance of confidentiality in a patent arbitration. However, it does not
have detailed treatment in the PAR Supplemental Rules. The IDRP does
consider confidentiality in a way that applies to IP. Article 34 states:
"Confidential information disclosed during the proceedings by the parties or
by witnesses shall not be divulged by an arbitrator or administrator., 276 It
leaves open the issue of what the parties can divulge, but this can be covered
by a confidentiality agreement.
In contrast the ad hoc rules from the International Institute for Conflict
Prevention & Resolution have detailed provisions dealing with
confidentiality. Rule 17 details confidentiality and states that the parties will
insure that their agents, employees, attorneys, and experts agree in writing to
be bound by the rule.277 It further provides that, after a short time, all
documents will be returned or destroyed, and that each party and each
arbitrator shall certify under oath the compliance with this requirement. 278
UNCITRAL Rules state that the hearings are to be held in camera unless the
parties agree differently.279 The award is to be made public only with the
consent of the parties.25 ° ICC Rules in Appendix 1 of Article 6 specify that
"the work of the court is confidential" and this "must be respected by
everyone who participates in that work." In contrast, the LCIA Rules
271. Id.
272. United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
273. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § I available at
http://www.chamber.se/arbitration/shared-files/laws/arbitract-us-cont.htm (last visited Mar. 10,
2009).
274. CAR, supra note 156, R. 31 (c).
275. PAR, supra note 153.
276. IDRP, supra note 122, art. 34.
277. CPR Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration of Patent and Trade Secret Disputes,
available at http://www.cpradr.org/pdfs/patentrulesmasterchanges05.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
278. Id.
279. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 135.
280. UNCITRAL, supra note 135.
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requires that the parties keep confidential all awards and materials in the
arbitral proceedings created for the purpose. 21 All documents produced for
the purpose are confidential unless they were already in the public
domain.282
The WIPO Arbitration Rules pay special attention to this issue. Article
52 defines confidential information as being expressed in any medium,
though here the main focus is on trade secrets.2 83 These rules even provide
for appointing an expert to report upon the nature of the information and
determine what measures, if any, can be used to protect it.2 84 The WIPO
Rules go much further than protecting trade secrets; article 73 deals with the
confidentiality of the existence of the arbitration.2 85 Except when connected
to a court challenge to an arbitration or enforcement action, "no information
concerning the existence of an arbitration may be unilaterally disclosed...
unless required to do so" by a competent authority. 28 6 Article 74 deals with
the confidentiality of disclosures made during the arbitration.287 Article 75
covers the confidentiality of the award. 28
Article 76 deals with the confidentiality of the Center and arbitrator. 89
No other set of institutional rules impose such stringent confidentiality rules.
This issue was clearly regarded as of central importance in IP disputes. Yet,
even here is a public interest element. Article 76(b) states: ". . .the Center
may include information concerning the arbitration in any aggregate
statistical data that it publishes concerning its activities provided that such
information does not enable the parties or the particular circumstances of the
dispute to be identified. ' 290  This provision is clearly in keeping with
information collection, and is consistent with an "academic" need to know.
The parties have no duty of confidentiality in Germany. However, the
duty can be imposed either through a clause in the arbitration agreement or
via institutional rules. The German Institute of Arbitration has arbitration
rules that contain relatively strict provisions.2 91 This is likely to "fill in the
gap" left by German legislation and induce international arbitration. Section
281. LCIA Rules, supra note 113, art. 30.
282. LCIA Rules, supra note 113.
283. WIPO Rules, supra note 205, art. 52.
284. WIPO Rules, supra note 205.
285. Id. at art. 73.
286. Id.
287. Id. at art. 74.
288. Id. at art. 75.
289. Id. at art. 76.
290. Id. at art. 76(b).
291. DIS Arbitration Rules, available at http://www.dis-arb.de/scho/schiedsordnung98-e-
Euro.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
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43 of the rules outlines the duty of confidentiality, but information of the
arbitral proceedings may be published in compilations of statistical data, but
this will exclude identification of the persons involved. 92 As long as this
information is of limited content, for "statistical purposes" as stated, this
appears to be a small compromise.2 93 Even a small amount of information, a
key fact, may be enough to allow a careful reader to identify participants in
an IP dispute. This provision is similar to the WIPO Rules.
Confidentiality in arbitration raises important issues regarding
supervision. EC officials have raised concerns about companies concluding
agreements that are in violation of competition provisions in the EC
Treaty.294 A particular case was between two European companies that had
concluded a market sharing agreement in violation of Article 85 of the EC
Treaty.295 The agreement was under Swiss law, and one original signed
contract was secreted in a Swiss bank.296 No copies were allowed to be
made, and the arbitrators could not refer to it in their decision. 97 In cases
like these, arbitration can be used to flout the law.
Some commentators suggest that the confidential nature of arbitration
also works against the public interest: "Keeping patent proceedings
confidential not only denies the public notice and suppresses problematic
laws, but also withholds the empirical evidence that is necessary to evaluate
whether ADR is efficacious in resolving patent disputes. 298 It is difficult to
evaluate this statement, as public notice of patent disputes must be provided
to the USPTO in order to be enforced. However, there is still a risk. Most
arbitration laws and institutional rules allow the parties to keep the details of
the arbitration confidential, it is possible that neither party would desire to
publicize particulars of invalidity, and there is the possibility that the parties
could collude and suppress evidence. 99 In litigation, this is less of a
concern.300 Indeed, the heart of a patent is the grant of a limited monopoly
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Jacques Wemer, Application of Competition Laws by Arbitrators, The Step Too Far, 12 J.
INT'L ARB. 23, 23 (1995).
295. Id. at 23-24.
296. Id. at 24.
297. Id.
298. See Lim, supra note 33, at 183.
299. M.A. Smith, et al., Arbitration of Patent Infringement and Validity Issues Worldwide, 19
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 299, 312 (2006).
300. Seeid. at312.
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in exchange for public disclosure. The public is aware of the scope of the
patent, and at the expiry of that term, the information is in the public
domain. Arbitration is far from the public domain, and unlike court
proceedings, details are not usually published. The public may therefore run
the risk of not being informed of invalid patents. If this became a common
event it could influence inventive output. It may also have a
disproportionate effect on small to medium sized businesses that would be
"out of the loop."
As to the effectiveness of arbitration in resolving disputes, it appears
that the basic information from arbitral institutions suggests that arbitration
is increasingly used for IP issues. According to many commentators, as well
as the specialized WIPO Rules, confidentiality is a critical issue in IP
arbitration. According to WIPO Rules, as well as the rules of the German
Institute of Arbitration, there is some provision for public access to
information. 30 1  Whether this is enough might be a matter for debate.
However, the special need to keep arbitration confidential, particularly those
arbitrations involving IP issues, might lead to tilting the scale more towards
confidentiality and less towards complete disclosure.
VIII. INTERIM RELIEF
An arbitral tribunal can award economic damages, but there are other
remedies that are essential in patent disputes. Patent rights give an inventor
the right to exclude others from using, making, selling, or importing an
invention.30 2 A party may be positioned in the market with a project that is
being challenged by a competitor who has no right to be making, selling, or
importing an invention. Damages, particularly to the reputation of a
product, may be difficult to quantify in monetary terms. It may be an
irreparable alteration of the status quo. An infringer who could not be
restrained with an interim order, if they lost the infringement arbitration,
may be in the same position as they were in before. They may be compelled
to take out a license. The end result is that with no real incentive to take out
a license beforehand, litigation may be increased. This is certainly not the
intention of arbitration.
The threat of injunction is therefore a major motivating force to compel
an infringer to settle. It is no easy matter to determine if the arbitral tribunal
can order an injunction in an international arbitration. First, the arbitration
agreement must be examined, as the parties can agree to restrict the available
remedies. If this is silent, the rules that govern the agreement, if any, must
301. WIPO Rules, supra note 205.
302. 35 C.F.R. § 271 (2005).
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be examined. The lexfori may allow only certain issues to be decided by a
tribunal, no matter what the intention of the parties. At the same time the
law of the state that granted the patent is also important. It is possible that
the seat of arbitration requires that a court intervene to apply interim
measures. If the seat is not in the place that issued the patent, this would
require courts to assist a foreign arbitration with an interim measure.303
Some countries, like Sweden, will not enforce orders for interim relief
from arbitrators. 3°4 This does not mean the arbitrators cannot order interim
measures.3"5 The SCC rules contain provisions for interim measures.30 6 But
no matter what the position of interim relief in local law, arbitration may still
be an unsuitable solution if interim measures are required. It takes time to
establish an arbitral tribunal, and if a party needs immediate action it may be
faster to seek it from a competent court.307  As an example, in France
arbitrators can grant the same interim measures as judges.30 8 Such interim
measures would be issued as interim awards, assuming they are closely
related to the matter in dispute. 30 9  The national court may also take
conservatory or provisional measures, and this is the preferred method.310 A
provisional award requires confirmation by the court before it is enforced. 31 1
A court can also be involved in the granting of an interim injunction before
the tribunal is formed.312 This is a different matter.
303. See John A. Fraser, I1, Congress Should Address the Issue of Provisional Remedies for
Intellectual Property Disputes Which Are Subject to Arbitration, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSp. RESOL.
505, 534 (1998).
304. See Heuman, supra note 129, at 333.
305. Certain interim measures may be enforced in Sweden if they are provisional awards. See
id. at 333. Such an award must be a specific issue that is severable and independent from the
substantive issue to be decided later. It should presumably be enforceable under the New York
Convention even if it is not termed an award. See id.
306. Article 32 states that the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, grant any interim
measure it deems appropriate. It may take the form of an order or award.
Arbitration Rules, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (2007), available at
http://www.sccinstitute.se/_upload/shared-files/artikelarkiv/2007-scc-magnusson-shaughnessy-siar
_2006_.3.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
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The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
has recently been amended to provide stronger interim relief.313 The model
law now clearly states in Article 17(A)(1)(a) that the party requesting the
interim measure must satisfy the Tribunal that: "Harm not adequately
repairable by an award of damages is likely to result if the measure is not
ordered, and such harm substantially outweighs the harm that is likely to
result to the party against whom the measure is directed if the measure is
granted..., There also has be a "reasonable possibility" that the
requesting party will succeed on the merits. This places the grounds for
granting interim relief on solid footing. Article 17(B) grants the tribunal
powers to grant preliminary orders. 315 These can be made by a party directly
to the tribunal; the opposing party need not be notified.31 6 The preliminary
order accompanies an interim measure, and is a direction not meant to
frustrate the purpose of the interim measure.3 17 The preliminary order is
binding, but cannot be enforced by a court.318 These provisions in the
amended law, while possibly not specifically designed to deal with IP, are
significant considerations for a party contemplating arbitration.
As an interesting aside, the FAA 311 was not influenced by the
UNCITRAL Model Law, as was the arbitration law of many other nations.
The Federal Act does not provide for interim measures, which has led to
some inconsistent judgments by a minority of U.S. courts. This has led one
commentator to suggest that section 3 of the FAA should be amended to
specifically empower arbitrators to grant provisional or interim relief.
However, in practice most courts enforce interim measures ordered by
arbitral tribunals if the power was granted to the tribunal by the arbitration
agreement. 32 In most cases this leaves the issue to be covered by
institutional rules. 321 There is great variation in how institutions handle the
subject.
The PAR stated simply in Rule 33: "The arbitrator may issue such
orders for interim relief as may be deemed necessary to safeguard the
property that is the subject matter of the arbitration, to preserve evidence,
and/or to protect trade secrets or other proprietary information that might be
313. The UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985, section 17, was only a paragraph. See
UNCITRAL, supra note 135.
314. See id. at art. 17(A)(1)(a).
315. See id. at art. 17(B).
316. See id.
317. See id. at art. 17(C).
318. See id. at art. 17(C)(5).
319. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000).




Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol9/iss2/3
[Vol. 9: 2, 2009]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
disclosed during the arbitration. 322 It is interesting to note here that there is
a distinction between "property," which would presumably include patents,
and "trade secrets," which are linked with proprietary information. The rule
is labeled "Interim Measures," but also clearly deals with the issue of
confidentiality, which does not receive specific treatment in the other PAR
rules. This section was drafted in a particularly confusing way, and it is
perhaps no surprise that it was recently withdrawn.
Rule 34 of the CAR is clear, as it deals only with interim measures.32 3 It
does not deal with the issue of proprietary information. It states that an
arbitrator may take whatever interim measures deemed to be necessary,
including injunctive relief.3 24 These may take the form of an interim award,
but the tribunal may require security for costs. 32 5  Request for interim
measure is not incompatible with the right to arbitrate.3 26 CAR Rule 34
states the issue in ways that are applicable to issues beyond IP, in keeping
with the broad based purpose of these rules.327 The Supplemental Rules
establish in Rule L-3 that the necessity of injunctive relief may be included
on the agenda at the preliminary hearing.328 From the relative position of
injunctive relief on the list, one may assume it is of lesser importance, but
this may be due to the fact that parties may usually resort to court action
rather than waiting for the constitution of an arbitral tribunal.
The CAR also has "Optional Rules for Emergency Measures of
Protection. ' 329 It provides for emergency measures to be considered by an
emergency arbitrator before an arbitrator is selected to consider the
dispute. 330  According to Optional Rule 4, the emergency arbitrator can
order an interim award if the party seeking it can show that immediate and
irreparable loss or damage would result if the emergency relief was not
granted. 31 The emergency arbitrator must state their reasons for granting
322. CAR, supra note 156.
323. Id. at R. 34.
324. Id. at R. 34(a).
325. Id. at R. 34(b).
326. Id. at R. 34(c).
327. Id. at R. 34.
328. CAR, supra note 156, at R. L-3.
329. CAR, supra note 156.
330. Id. at R. O-1.
331. Id. at R. 0-4.
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the emergency relief.332 This is a method of handling a problem without
going to a court for assistance.
The ICC rules state in Article 23(1): "Unless the parties have otherwise
agreed, as soon as the file has been transmitted to it, the Arbitral Tribunal
may, at the request of a party, order any interim or conservatory measure it
deems appropriate. 333  The wording here is from the French "mesures
provisoires ou conservatoires." It is more or less clear that the tribunal can,
at the request of a party, order what is termed in English an interim
injunction.3 34 Article 23(2) states:
Before the file is transmitted to the Arbitral Tribunal, and in appropriate circumstances
even thereafter, the parties may apply to any competent judicial authority for interim or
conservatory measures. The application of a party to a judicial authority for such
measures or for the implementation of any such measures ordered by an Arbitral Tribunal
shall not be deemed to be an infringement or a waiver of the arbitration agreement and
shall not affect the relevant powers reserved to the Arbitral Tribunal.
The latter article is what could be said to be standard procedure among
arbitral institutions. However, it clarifies an issue that may arise in practice.
Even before a tribunal is formed, the parties can go to a court without
waiving their right to arbitration.335
The ICC recognizes that, in some cases, where immediate interim relief
is required, arbitration may not be a good option. 3 6 This is apparently why
the ICC rules, unlike the ICDR rules, specifically address a situation where
recourse to a court is required. 337  The ICC rules also cover a pre-arbitral
referee procedure. Article 2 states that the referee may: ". . .[O]rder any
conservatory measures or any measures of restitution that are urgently
necessary to prevent either immediate damage or irreparable loss and so to
safeguard any of the rights or property of one of the parties.338 This article
in no uncertain terms applies to IP issues. However, in order for expedited
332. Id.
333. ICC Rules, supra note 108, art. 23(1).
334. Id. at art. 23(2).
335. Id.
336. ICC, Current and Emerging Intellectual Property Issues for Business - A Roadmap for
Business and Policy Makers 50 (2007), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/intellectual-property/pages/IP-Roadmap-2005.pdf
(last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
337. ICC Rules, supra note 108.
338. Rules for a Pre-Arbitral Referee Procedure, Jan. 1990, at Art. 2.1(a), available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id4427/index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
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arbitration to take place the parties must specifically agree. In practice few
parties agree to appoint a pre-arbitral referee.33 9
The WIPO Arbitration Rules3 40 are specifically designed to meet the
needs of IP arbitration, and it is no surprise that interim measures of
protection are considered in detail. Article 46(a) states: "At the request of a
party, the Tribunal may issue any provisional orders or take other interim
measures it deems necessary, including injunctions. .34. Article 46(d) of
the WIPO Arbitration Rules also specifies that a request by a party to a court
for interim measures or for the implementation of any such measure or order
granted by the Tribunal is not incompatible with, or deemed a waiver of, the
Arbitration Agreement.3 42  Article 46 remains unchanged from the WIPO
Arbitration Rules to the WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules (in fact only a
few details were changed).343
An important question arises in respect of granting interim relief. If a
patent holder has agreed to arbitrate an infringement dispute, do they give up
the option of pursuing interim relief in the arbitration? The situation in the
United States is fairly clear in that, unless restricted by the wording of the
arbitration agreement or special circumstances, an arbitrator can grant
injunctive relief.344 This may, at times, be an express provision, but mostly
may be implied by either the generality of the submission clause, or by the
way the rules have been worded for the conduct of future arbitration.345 In
case law, U.S. courts have held that they deem the arbitrator and not the
courts to have issued an injunction.346
If any common themes emerge, it is that the issue of interim relief is
complicated. The parties may make a different agreement from the
institutional rules, but in general the arbitral institutions have rules that allow
it. It may be at the request of a party, or an issue for the tribunal to order on
339. Peter Sherwin, et al., Proskauer on International Litigation and Dispute Resolution, Jan.
2008, at 11I(B)(5)(e), available at http://www.proskauerguide.com/arbitration/19/1ll (last visited
Mar. 10, 2009).
340. WIPO Rules, supra note 205, at 18-104.
341. Id. at art. 46(a).
342. Id. at art. 46(d).
343. In the WIPO Expedited Rules, the section on "Interim Measures of protection and security
for costs" is Article 40, WIPO Rules, supra note 205, at 40, available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/enlarbitration/expedited-rules/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
344. Paul M. Janicke, Maybe We Shouldn't Arbitrate: Some Aspects of the Risk/Benefit
Calculus ofAgreeing to Binding Arbitration of Patent Disputes, 39 HOus. L. REv. 693, 707 (1992).
345. See id. at 707.
346. Ruppert v. Egelhofer, 148 N.E.2d 129 (N.Y. 1958).
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its own motion. If enforcement is an issue, it is a matter for the local court
to decide. In this case it may be helpful if the interim relief is termed a
"preliminary award." Court intervention might also be an option to obtain
interim relief in a speedy manner before the tribunal is formed. In the latter
case some institutions, such as the ICC and ICDR, have special rules that
allow the appointment of an emergency arbitrator. These seem not to be a
popular option.
IX. CONCLUSION
Arbitration can be an effective way of settling disputes, or part of a
dispute, that involves patents. However, according to jurisdiction, some
issues, such as patent validity, may not be arbitrable. In this case arbitration
can be used for part of the dispute, perhaps bearing upon licensing alone.3
47
Issues of patent validity can be settled via litigation. It may also be possible
in some jurisdictions for the tribunal to request a ruling on validity, although
this may sacrifice confidentiality.3 48 Regarding validity in the United States,
the arbitral process will not be able to compete with litigation.349 If a patent
has survived review in the Federal Circuit, it is granted a greater amount of
respect in the industry than one that has not been "confirmed."35 Parties
may even agree that an arbitral award will be vacated or modified if the
patent in dispute is later found to be invalid or unenforceable.35" ' When
taken in this light, a high value patent might be better served by a trial than
by arbitration.
Litigation and arbitration have particular strengths and weaknesses.
Interestingly, in U.S. law an arbitral tribunal can order awards that a court
cannot.352 This can include the possibility of granting an accused infringer a
license based on the plaintiffs misuse of a patent.353  Costs are a critical
issue. For example, for a plaintiff there are lower discovery and expert
costs, but the final settlement may not be as high as it would have been
through litigation. 54  Since most patent suits cost between one and two
347. See Smith et al., supra note 299, at 340-41.
348. The arbitral tribunal can seek assistance from a court where it has no jurisdiction. See
Smith et al., supra note 299, at 314.
349. See Lim, supra note 33, at 177.
350. See id.
351. AAA Resolution of Patent Disputes Supplementary Rules (2006), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=27417 (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
352. See Smith et al., supra note 299, at 327.
353. A U.S. court can render a patent temporarily unenforceable but cannot grant a license. See
Smith et al., supra note 299, at 328.
354. Koppikar, supra note 10, at 165.
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million dollars, if the damages sought are below this figure, it would be wise
to consider arbitration.355 If high damages are sought, in the region of tens
of millions of dollars, it is likely that litigation would be a better option,
although some preliminary issues such as claim interpretation may be
addressed using arbitration.356 Clearly from this assessment an arbitration
clause that submits all claims arising from a contract to arbitration would not
be advisable.
The parties must also make a choice if they want to operate on an ad hoc
or on an institutional basis.357 Without an institution the arbitration is likely
to cost less. There may also be greater flexibility without institutional
rules. 358 However, in order for an ad hoc arbitration to work effectively the
parties must cooperate to a greater degree than in institutional arbitration.359
It is certain that taking the dispute to court would be the most expensive
option, so the added expense of an institution might be worth the cost. 360 In
a 2005 Fulbright & Jaworski Litigation Trends Survey, almost two-thirds of
respondents favored institutional over ad hoc arbitration.36' It is unfortunate
that this survey did not go into greater detail as to why institutional
arbitration was favoured. No doubt there were factors, such as name
recognition or prestige, involved. At the same time differences between
institutional rules may have played a role.
Some institutional rules are more or less favourable to a particular kind
of dispute. However, it appears from the statistical evidence that the larger
arbitral institutions handle a proportionately larger amount of IP disputes.
For U.S. and U.K. companies, the AAA/ICDR was the preferred institution,
and the ICC was in second place.3 62 Without a detailed survey it is difficult
to be sure, but it appears that companies use those institutions they know
from other arbitrations to handle IP disputes. Large institutions, such as the
AAA, have special patent arbitration rules, and these have been recently
355. Id. at 166.
356. See id.
357. A Comparison Between the ICC Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
(Alway Associates, February 1995), available at http://www.alway-associates.co.uk/legal-
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altered. To date, WIPO has had over 100 requests for arbitration.3 63
Because the arbitration and mediation center was only founded in 1994, this
demonstrates that the larger arbitral institutions may face increasing
competition from WIPO.
Various arbitral institutions deal with evidence in very different ways.
The CAR, based on a particularity of American law, allow an arbitrator to
issue a subpoena that can be enforced under the FAA. This is a particularly
compelling reason for arbitrating a dispute in the United States under the
AAA rules, which clearly spell out the powers of an arbitrator.364 In
contrast, other national laws and arbitral institutions-even if they allow a
court to assist taking evidence-leave the issue unclear. The issue of experts
is more complicated. WIPO rules are geared specifically for patent related
issues and the need for experts. Other arbitral institutions consider experts
as witnesses, and allow the tribunal to decide how to deal with the issue. At
this juncture it is important to consider if stringent rules of evidence would
help or hurt the arbitral process.
There is an increasing tendency for arbitration to take on the form of a
mini-trial. Lawyers, experts, and formal rules of evidence and procedure
add considerably to cost and time. This has been well demonstrated by the
rise in the amount of IP arbitration, and a corresponding decline in the
amount of litigation. But it cannot be assumed that the current situation is
the best of all possibilities. Arbitrating patent related issues does not have a
long history, and there is little information regarding what the parties want.
A high degree of confidentiality may be blocking the progress of
institutional rules. It is difficult to tell at this early stage how significant a
factor this is or may become in influencing future rules.
The result of arbitration is and has been mostly confidential, even when
judicial confirmation of the award is ordered. Scholars and commentators
have sought to overcome this difficulty with practitioner surveys, yet it
appears that arbitral institutions and other professional organizations would
be in the best position to generate this kind of primary research.3 65 In the
United States public notice must be supplied of the arbitral award, including
if invalidity was considered, before it can be enforced. This may be a good
model for other nations to follow as well, but does it go far enough? The
parties to an arbitration clearly value confidentiality, but if too stringent, the
process may become rapidly out of step with current needs. A balance must
be struck.
363. WIPO Caseload Summary, available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/center/caseload.html
(last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
364. AAA, supra note 361.
365. See Janicke, supra note 344, at 726.
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Many arbitral institutions contain detailed provisions for interim relief.
How effective these are is a matter of debate. It appears that parties in need
of rapid action go to a competent court. The United States follows the laws
of most other nations in allowing parties to pursue judicial interim relief
without losing their right to arbitrate. Institutional rules differ substantially
at times with regard to who can order interim relief, but it is standard for
institutional rules to allow it.
To return to the central question, what role do institutional rules play in
an unfolding patent dispute? First, it is clear that only particular kinds of
patent disputes, those not considering validity and perhaps those involving
relatively low value patents tend to be arbitrated.3 66 There are reasons why
litigation will remain the preferred method for settling patent disputes. If a
patent survives litigation, it has been confirmed. Changes to institutional
rules to make the process more "stringent" may have the effect of raising the
cost and make litigation more rather than less attractive for low value
patents. For the foreseeable future, it may be that arbitral institutions should
focus on their niche and not try to introduce detailed rules to confuse the
issue. As long as such central tenants of flexibility of evidential rules, a high
degree of confidentiality, and recourse to courts for interim relief are
present, it seems parties will continue to arbitrate some - or some parts of -
patent disputes.3 67 On the other hand, complacency is unwise as well.
The WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center was only recently
established, yet has a growing caseload of arbitrations. WIPO rules are
specifically tailored to IP issues. Without a doubt these rules are the most
detailed in their coverage of the powers of the arbitral tribunal. The WIPO
rules do not impose rules that risk making arbitration into litigation, but
rather clarify issues that may arise, particularly involving patents. In a
highly technical field, such as patent law, arbitrators can be selected for their
technical training rather than legal knowledge. As a result, it may be best to
clearly delineate issues that could present a problem for those with no legal
background. In this way, WIPO Rules strive to make the legal issues crystal
clear. Time will tell if this is an effective way of conducting arbitrations
involving patent issues, but following current trends, it appears that this is a
model that should be adopted by other arbitral institutions.
366. See Lim, supra note 33, at 177.
367. Smith et al., supra note 299.
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